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MARK SCHWEHN

The Value of Evoking Vocation and
the Vocation of Evoking Value
The deliberately convoluted title of this talk was inspired by my
growing sense, as an administrator at a Lutheran University,
that we have over the course of the last decade suffered from
a diminished capacity to talk about the value of the education
we provide even as we have increased our ability to discuss
thoughtfully cost, pricing strategies, financial aid matrices,
disruptive innovation, MOOCs, and a growing list of hot topics
within the discourse of higher education. I intend my remarks
as a small corrective to this tendency. However, I do not wish
to encourage equally alarming tendencies to circle wagons
around an unsustainable educational model or to hanker after
a real or imagined Golden Age of Lutheran higher education
informed by timeless ideals with little or no regard for the
specific context within which those ideals must have life and
pertinence. In other words, any compelling articulation of the
value of Lutheran higher education must be mindful of the
turbulence of our academic times.
My consideration of the value Lutheran higher education
will consist of four parts. I will first present a recent analytical
description of a college education that should provide both
another dimension to the central problem of the commodification of higher education, and a direct challenge to the
value of a Lutheran education, rightly understood. I will then,
in the next two parts, consider two of the most important
implications of the Lutheran concept of vocation for higher

education, its invitation to re-conceptualize the hallowed
distinction between liberal and professional studies and its
insistence that we are all called simultaneously to multiple
vocations. Finally, in a short final section, I will turn to
certain practices that are central to all institutions of higher
learning that Lutherans need to re-think and re-formulate
in order more fully to realize the distinctive character of
Lutheran higher education informed by the idea of vocation.

Disaggregation or Disintegration?
About a year ago, Michael Staton, the co-founder and CEO
of Inigral, a company that offers a variety of technologies to
enhance educational practices, answered the question, “What
is College?” as follows:
College is a packaged bundle of content, services, experiences,
and signals that result in an education with both inherent
and transferable value to the learner. The end goal of this
educational package is to prepare learners for the job market,
as well as to instill the knowledge, procedures, and values
that make individuals effective at navigating, succeeding
within, and adding value to our society. (Staton 4-5)
To construe college as a bundle of contents and services
rather than as an integral whole comprised of parts is
to invite the kind of activity described by the title of the
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address in which Staton’s definition of college appears,
“Disaggregating the Components of a College Degree.”
The major aim of Staton’s address was to demonstrate that
the internet was already providing and would continue to
provide many of the components of a college degree much
more effectively and much more cheaply than the on-campus
experience at the average college. He thus sought to unbundle
those components from others that could not so easily be
provided through the internet, inviting colleges to focus on
the latter while relying on new technologies to provide the
former. So, for example, content authoring, production, and
transfer need no longer be left to faculty members, given the
enormous resources already available free of charge on the
internet, whereas mentoring and the supervision of metacognitive processes could not so easily be replaced by technology
and should be left to faculty members.
Though most of us, including me, will find the vocabulary
of disaggregation, commodification, and bundling repugnant,
we should not be too quick to dismiss Staton’s analysis altogether. Indeed, I suspect that most of us have already applied
his analysis to some degree or another, perhaps without realizing it. Faculty members, for example, are constantly engaged
in improving their pedagogy, so many of them have long since
used resources available on the internet to supply content or to
provide out of class exercises to sharpen skills so that classroom activity can be addressed to collective endeavors to solve
problems, apply concepts, and consider the content delivered
on the internet in fresh ways. This is what flipped classrooms
are all about. In sum, Staton’s analysis can be used as a kind of
roadmap to help all of us enhance the distinctive education we
provide through various technologies.
However, Staton’s message is finally deeply disturbing, and
it is inimical to the concept of a Lutheran education informed
by the idea of vocation. He really is recommending disaggregation, i.e. farming out completely some of our most vital
learning activities to service providers outside of our colleges
and universities. So, for example, he writes that colleges
should allow their students to “go through their general
education courses online” (16). At Valparaiso University, this
recommendation, if taken seriously, would be catastrophic.
Our Freshman Core course that runs the entire year and
that is the foundation of our general education program
introduces students to college life, forms them into small and
enduring communities of inquiry, cultivates within them
a number of pre-disciplinary skills, imbues them with the
ethos of the institution, gives them a common vocabulary
including an understanding of the Lutheran idea of vocation,
and provides nine months of common experience during
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their first year for the students in all of our several colleges
and schools. Would we dare to turn this vital enterprise over
to one or another of the several external service providers?

“We must, as part of our effort to articulate
the value of a Lutheran education, recover
and strengthen those implications of our
common vocation that require us to insist
upon an education that is integral and
whole, possessed of a distinctive kind
of integrity.”
Enhancements and economies, hybrid courses, on-line
offerings as part of a larger integrated curricular program are
one thing; complete disaggregation of the services, content,
experiences, and “signals” (to use Staton’s terminology) is
quite another. Lutheran colleges and universities, in order to
be faithful to their mission statements and their callings as
colleges and universities of the church, seek to form as well
as inform, to shape character as well as to cultivate arts and
skills, to show forth every day, in the way that community life
is ordered, that the moral, the social, the intellectual, and the
spiritual virtues are inextricable and mutually reinforcing.
Disaggregation, if carried to extremes, becomes disintegration. A call or summons, whether to an institution or to an
individual, is addressed to a whole school or person, not
to some truncated version of the same. In these days and
times, we must, as part of our effort to articulate the value of
a Lutheran education, recover and strengthen those implications of our common vocation that require us to insist
upon an education that is integral and whole, possessed of a
distinctive kind of integrity, if you will.

Practicality of the Liberal Arts
One such implication involves a reconceptualization of
the relationship between liberal and professional study as
warranted by the Lutheran understanding of vocation. Note
that Stanton stipulated that the first goal of a college should
be to “prepare learners for the job market.” Though such a
claim used to dismay defenders of the value of liberal education, we have witnessed over the course of the last couple of
years a decided apparent shift in both the attitude to such
claims and in the rhetorical strategies used to defend the
value of liberal learning by its strongest proponents. Friends
of liberal education have increasingly defended the liberal
arts on instrumental or utilitarian grounds: “The job market

is rapidly changing; therefore, college graduates need to be
prepared for jobs that have not yet been created. Moreover,
most people will change jobs three or four times at least
during the course of their lives. Therefore, students need
the arts and skills and habits of mind that only the liberal
arts can cultivate. Students need to learn how to learn, to be
enabled to be flexibly responsive to the global market, and to
be secure enough in their own identities and convictions to
endure the hardships and disappointments they are bound to
face. So if you want to be practical, get a liberal arts degree.
Narrowly technical training makes no sense.”
Although this defense of a liberal education has much to
recommend it, many of those who advance it do so grudgingly or with a guilty conscience. Guilt stems from the
conviction that liberal education is diminished whenever
its proponents stress its instrumental value over and above
its intrinsic goodness. Knowledge for its own sake! Liberal
education as an end in itself! To advance the cause of liberal
education in any other terms than those that these battle cries
suggest is to debase the currency of the liberal arts, thereby
contributing to the narrowly practical mentality that has
led—so the story goes—to the progressive demise of liberal
education in our times.

“Lutheran educators who are and who
should be friends of liberal learning
should be more suspicious of claims
that liberal education is an end in itself
than of claims that the liberal arts are
good for the sake of empowering and
equipping human beings for various
kinds of work in the world.”
Friends of the liberal arts should not be plagued by
these doubts and self-recriminations. The history of liberal
education provides ample warrants for defending it on
instrumental grounds. Moreover, Lutheran educators who
are and who should be friends of liberal learning should
be more suspicious of claims that liberal education is an
end in itself than of claims that the liberal arts are good
for the sake of empowering and equipping human beings
for various kinds of work in the world. Or, to put matters
more positively, Lutherans should be guiltlessly disposed
to use instrumental arguments to defend liberal education.
Both the Lutheran concept of vocation and Luther’s and
Melanchthon’s own defenses of what we today call liberal

education demand that we understand, defend, and promote
liberal learning in terms of its proper uses, not in terms of
pure self-cultivation.
Bruce Kimball’s Orators and Philosophers: A History of the
Ideal of Liberal Education still remains, after twenty-five years,
the most authoritative source on the history of liberal education. As the title suggests, Kimball identified two separate,
sometimes competing, sometimes complementary versions of
liberal education that began to develop in ancient Greece and
that continue to the present time. The two arose simultaneously
in the fifth century BCE. The first, the philosophical tradition
or the “liberal free” ideal, stemmed from Socratic notions of
inquiry as a path to individual excellence, of self-examination
as indispensable to human flourishing, and of contemplation, not action, as the most choice-worthy human activity.
Contemporary defenses of liberal education that stress critical
thinking, intellectual virtues, knowledge as an end in itself, the
importance self-reflection, self-cultivation, and self-knowledge,
and the never-ending project of disciplining and furnishing
the mind to enable and secure the full realization of one’s own
humanity all can trace their lineage to Socrates.
The oratorical tradition stemmed from the rhetorician
Isocrates and came into full flower three centuries later in the
work of the Roman philosopher Cicero. Liberal education, as it
unfolded within this tradition, stressed speech and language,
the moral virtues, good character, and knowledge for the sake
of action in the world of public life. Contemporary defenses
of the liberal arts that stress character formation, the primacy
of inter-subjectivity over private thought, community, usefulness, civic engagement, and public service can trace their
lineage to Isocrates and Cicero. Those who defend the liberal
arts by stressing their usefulness for a life of action in the
world, including professional life, can draw upon this tradition
without a bad conscience.

Education for Citizenship
As Kimball insists throughout his book, the two traditions
he identifies were never really present in their “pure” forms;
rather, they more often represent two intertwined strands
of a single tradition. When he published his book in 1986,
however, he believed that the philosophical or liberal free
strand was definitely in the ascendancy. Over the subsequent quarter century, the rhetorical strand has gradually
overtaken the philosophical strand in the discourse about
liberal education. Kimball himself came to believe, during
the course of his work on American pragmatism, that in the
United States at least, public, pragmatic philosophers, like the
late Richard Rorty, shifted the discourse of liberal education
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away from the liberal free tradition and toward the rhetorical
tradition. Moreover, the largest national association devoted
to liberal education, the Association of American Colleges
and Universities, has for about twenty-five years stressed
“education for democracy” as one of its major programmatic
emphases. AAC&U has definitely come to understand liberal
education as education for citizenship above all else.
Such a conception is far from an innovation. Rather,
as the (then) Archbishop Rowan Williams reminded the
Oxford University community seven years ago in his
Commemoration Day Sermon (June, 2004), the medieval
universities in Europe, the places that supplied the context for
the Protestant Reformation, arose primarily from the practical need for lawyers, doctors, and clergymen, especially for
trained canon lawyers. The Arts faculty was from the beginning a part of a larger educational enterprise devoted to the
preparation of “public people,” in Williams’s words, people
who were equipped to go forth into the world enabled to
distinguish between good arguments and bad ones, to honor
the importance of reasoned speech, and to contribute to the
common good through the exercise of their professional
skills. For example, what later became a mere class marker
or an avenue to historical and cultural understanding, the
study of Latin, was initially a very “practical” undertaking.
Latin was the language in which legal and ecclesiastical business was transacted. Thus, those who today scorn language
courses that “merely” prepare, say, social workers to deal with
growing Hispanic populations on the grounds that such study
is not really liberal learning may have forgotten the principal
rationale for language study in the medieval university.

“Lutheran educators today should
be defending liberal learning in
a way that honors this ‘medieval
practicality.’”
Lutheran educators today should be defending liberal
learning in a way that honors this “medieval practicality,” as
Williams called it, not only because the medieval university
arose under decidedly Christian auspices but also because
Lutherans should agree, along with everyone else, that the
quality of public action and public discourse has been steadily
declining for years. Almighty God gave to human beings the
gift of reason, which, when disciplined through the arts of the
trivium (we today would call these arts and skills of critical
thinking, interpretation, and clear expression in writing and in
speech), equip men and women not only to read the Scriptures
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(which was the principal reason why the Reformers defended a
liberal arts education) but also to elevate the level and the tone
of public life. Historians of higher education in the United States
will someday ponder the question of which came first: the abandonment by some English departments (to name only one field
of study that should cultivate the arts of the trivium) of careful
attention to close reading, careful writing, and good argument
for the sake of the study of critical theory and the pursuit of
fashionable publication, or the decline of liberal arts majors.
Surely the two developments, widely reported and increasingly
lamented, are deeply connected. Defending in a persuasive way,
in word and deed, the liberal arts as “practical” skills should be
one primary strategy for reviving them in our time.

Life of the Mind as Religion
Should nothing be said to elevate in the public mind the
“liberal free” ideal, the idea of a liberal education for its own
sake? Is it not a good thing to invite men and women to
examine fundamental questions through the study of great
texts in order that they might become more fully human? Is
it not good to strengthen and furnish the mind through the
practice of the liberal arts? Is the capacity to think critically
not a noble end in itself? Perhaps the most eloquent defense
of the idea of liberal education as its own end was mounted by
Cardinal Newman in his The Idea of a University. No book on
higher education has been in our own time so widely revered
in theory and so little honored in practice. Though Newman
recognized very well that a liberal education would inevitably
have all sorts of practical results, he refused to defend it
on those grounds. Rather, he insisted that general knowledge (what we would today understand as a combination of
general education and liberal education) disciplined the mind
through the cultivation of intellectual virtues like sound
and balanced judgment, careful reasoning, and synthetic
comprehension. To be able to bring to bear upon any subject
the several perspectives of the academic disciplines in a
thorough, careful, and fair-minded way for the sake of
understanding the subject both steadily and in all its various
dimensions—this was the ideal of a general, liberal education.
It was, and it remains, an exalted and even a compelling ideal,
since Newman insisted, unlike most of today’s educators,
that theology had to be a part of the circle of learning (the
encyclo-paedeia) that constituted general knowledge. Properly
circumscribed and qualified, Newman’s idea of liberal education remains as worthy of defense by Christians today as it
was in the nineteenth century. And needless to say, the ideal
propounded by Newman depended upon a face-to-face collegial life, a context that would be difficult to disaggregate.

The qualifications and circumscriptions are critically
important, especially if the liberal arts are being defended
within the precincts of a church-related academy. Newman
distinguished the intellectual virtues of a liberal education
very sharply from moral virtues on the one hand and from
saintliness on the other. No amount of general knowledge
and no amount of liberal learning could by themselves
make a man morally virtuous. Newman famously writes,
“Quarry the granite rock with razors, or moor the vessel
with a thread of silk; then may you hope with such keen and
delicate instruments as human knowledge and human reason
to contend against those giants, the passion and the pride of
man” (121). It was the Church, not the university, that made
saints, Newman insisted. The university at its very best,
through the practice of liberal education, could only produce,
in the language of Newman’s time, the gentleman. Thus, for
example, the university may induce modesty, an intellectual
virtue associated with the recognition of the limits of one’s
own knowledge, but only the church could form the spiritual
virtue of humility based on the understanding that all of the
knowledge in the world counts for naught when one stands
alone before the judgment seat of God.
Absent the strictures that Newman placed around his
own ideal of liberal education, the “liberal free” tradition
has become in some places, over the course of the last two
centuries, a rough equivalent of the “religion” of the secular
academy. As Jim Turner has shown, in his book The Liberal
Education of Charles Eliot Norton and in several articles, at
the same time that the research university was marginalizing
Christianity from the formative role it had played in the antebellum colleges, the liberal arts and various fields of study
(especially the humanities) came to replace Christianity as
the source of intellectual synthesis, aesthetic cultivation, and
moral formation within the academy in the United States.
Within this broader context, Norton’s “invention of Western
Civilization” (both the course and the concept) was but one of
the most durable and successful efforts to shape the souls and
moral sentiments of students in a manner that had once fallen
within the province of religion. For the secular academy, this
development may well be regarded, even by Christians, as
salutary. But within the church-related university, unqualified
defense of the “liberal free” ideal is problematic.
The replacement of Christianity by some version of the
“liberal free” ideal within the secular academy may simply
have been the inevitable result of a deep conflict between them.
Leon Kass, considering the different ways in which “Athens
and Jerusalem” have understood and pursued wisdom, has
argued that the “liberal free” ideal may finally be incompatible

with the Judeo-Christian tradition. Three years ago, during a
conversation with me about liberal education, he spoke of the
incompatibility between Athens and Jerusalem. He argued
basically this: “If you rightly distinguish two points of departure: wonder seeking its replacement by knowledge, which
makes the perplexities go away, on the side of Athens, versus,
on the side of Jerusalem, the fear or reverence for the Lord,
which is only the beginning of wisdom but which is never
superseded by a kind of full understanding or by comfort in
the sufficiency of one’s own powers. The spirit of these two
points of departure is very different. Moreover, the wisdom
of Jerusalem makes extraordinary demands on how you are
to live. What begins with the fear and reverence for the Lord
soon issues in a long list of commandments about how to live
your life. By contrast, the pursuit of wisdom in the manner of
Plato and Aristotle, following the model of Socrates, produces
no obligation to family or community, and it seems that the
highest kind of life is a private life of self-fulfillment through
the pursuit of wisdom and reflection.”

Lutherans and the Liberal Arts
For Lutherans, then, the defense of liberal education in our
time represents a vitally important but extremely complicated
project. The liberal arts, justified in rhetorical terms, are quite
compatible with Christianity, since their exercise belongs
to the social and political realms in a way that provides for
human flourishing. Christians can readily join with their
secular counterparts in extolling the virtues of the contemporary counterpart of the trivium in promoting a spirit of public
service and in forming “public people” who practice reasoned
speech, careful argument, and honest and civil engagement
with fellow citizens in word and deed. The motives for such
advocacy may differ, but there is no disagreement over ends.
As the great monastic Bernard of Clairvaux said in the
century preceding the formation of the medieval university,
“Some seek knowledge for the sake of knowledge. That is
curiosity. Others seek knowledge that they may themselves
be known. That is vanity. But there are still others who seek
knowledge in order to serve and edify others, and that is
charity.” Most Christian and many secular educators today
would agree with Bernard.
The more “philosophical” tradition of liberal education,
the one that promotes critical thinking and self-examination
as practices leading to a life of private self-fulfillment and
self-sufficiency, can be advocated by educators within churchrelated academies only if, like Newman, they stress both the
powers and the limitations of this ideal. I myself would argue
that the philosophical tradition of liberal education can only
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become most fully itself, purged of its own inherent tendencies
toward a proud and self-sufficient intellectualism that mistakes
corrosive skepticism for logical rigor, in constructive engagement with religious traditions like Christianity. It may well
be that within the secular academy, the philosophical ideal of
liberal education is the very best that can be offered as both a
source and a bearer of wisdom and moral formation, and the
durability of that ideal offers grounds for recommending it.
Even so, the contemporary disenchantment with the liberal
arts may be connected in part to the increasingly unappealing
character of the good life for humankind as envisioned by the
“liberal free” ideal of Athens.

“The Lutheran idea of vocation rightly
understood must involve both serious
attention to matters of identity and
self-knowledge and to matters of
faithful action in the world, in other
words to a seamless integration of
the liberal and the professional, the
theoretical and the practical.”
Lutheran colleges and universities at their best attempt to
maintain a creative tension between Athens and Jerusalem—
and we might add today Benares and Shanghai and many other
centers of learning around the globe. The Lutheran idea of
vocation rightly understood must involve both serious attention to matters of identity and self-knowledge and to matters of
faithful action in the world, in other words to a seamless integration of the liberal and the professional, the theoretical and
the practical. Rightly articulated and developed, the Lutheran
idea of vocation simply dissolves these distinctions and sets
before the higher education community a set of practices that
have their meaning, their sense, and their purpose only within
a transcendent horizon and only in response to a summons
from outside of the self. Liberal education cannot fully be itself
unless it is pursued within a religious context.

A Certain Kind of Character
The Lutheran idea of vocation rightly understood and lived
out can enhance the value of liberal learning, but it can also
enhance and justify the value of the entire Lutheran college
experience. I use the qualifier “rightly understood” advisedly here, since two of the many good fruits borne by the
whole Lilly Endowment funded Project on the Theological
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Exploration of Vocation (PTEV) have been an extension into
the public realm of the provenance of the term vocation and
the recovery of the contested character of the concept of vocation within the Christian tradition. I want to acknowledge
the dynamic character of the concept here, but this is not
the place to review and analyze all of the various interpretations of the term. Instead, I want to consider one indisputably
Lutheran construal of the concept of vocation, namely that we
are called simultaneously to several tasks, i.e. we are multiply
stationed in the world as sons and daughters, citizens, educators, partners, and sometimes parents.
Though this teaching is well known among Lutherans,
our colleges and universities have been slow fully to develop
the implications of the teaching for Lutheran higher education. Perhaps the public fixation over the course of the last
decade on efforts to lead so-called “balanced lives” will impel
Lutheran educators to realize that preparing young men
and women for vocations in the world requires nothing less
than a re-description of human excellence that is grounded
in the idea of vocation. Such an understanding in turn will
require the development of a new moral vocabulary, a way of
speaking about what kind of lives are worthy of regard, admiration, and imitation. It will require as well self-conscious and
self-critical reflection upon how all of the integral practices
peculiar to Lutheran college life can be directed toward the
cultivation of this excellence.
Lutheran educators have for many years recognized and
valued the kind of excellence I have in mind here, and they
have even spent hundreds of thousands of dollars documenting
the success of Lutheran colleges and universities in cultivating
this excellence within the souls of their students. Several years
ago, the Lutheran Educational Conference of North America
(LECNA) commissioned a research organization, Hardwick/
Day, to do a sociological study that compared Lutheran graduates of Lutheran colleges with Lutheran graduates of flagship
state universities and secular liberal arts colleges. The graduates
of Lutheran colleges and universities consistently performed
more admirably than both comparative groups in multiple
domains of human endeavor. They voted more often, volunteered more often, read the daily newspaper more often, stayed
faithful to their partners more often, attended church more
often, and enjoyed their work more often. In other words, they
lived out their several concurrent vocations with great distinction: they displayed a Lutheran form of human excellence.
So far as I know, the publications that reported and
interpreted the results of this study made no effort systematically to link sociology and theology, to connect social facts

to theological ideas. I would nevertheless argue today that
a primary value of a Lutheran education is its capacity to
cultivate this peculiar kind of excellence, integrally connected
to the Lutheran idea of vocation but as yet only vaguely
described. As I have already suggested, the excellence is hard
to comprehend because we lack the vocabulary for doing so. I
know this from firsthand experience.

Placing Lives Well Lived
About ten years ago, I tried to pay proper tribute to a
Valparaiso University colleague who had died, a man named
John Strietelmeier. I realized, as I tried somehow to capture
John in words, that I did not have an adequate vocabulary to
do so. I had to create a new term of art that I still do not much
like, “local genius,” in my efforts to take the true measure of
the man and to extol his virtues for the community. I was
forced to invent this term of art because I discovered that
established categories of honor just did not fit John. So I did
the best I could to improvise both a tape measure of ethical
assessment and a lexicon of virtue by developing a typology
of human excellence that included the idea of the “local
genius,” which I have now come to think of as an expression
of living well in multiple stations within a local community.
Or, to put it differently, local genius summarizes a conception
of human excellence as the unfolding transaction between a
place and a person.
Aristotle famously remarked that in seeking to live nobly
there are many ways to go wrong but only one way to go right.
And he might have added that the same thing holds true for
assessing goodness and nobility in others. Once we have the
right tape measure, once we have prepared ourselves rightly to
take the measure of our fellow citizens, we can still go wrong—
as I discovered in the case of John—unless we distinguish
sharply among the following four types that are often confused:
the genius, the local genius, the local hero, and the great-souled
human being. There are family resemblances among these four
kinds of people, but they are finally quite distinct.
Geniuses are those who are both possessed of extraordinary
mental endowments and who use those gifts to create great
works of human intelligence and imagination—Jane Austen
in literature, Einstein in science, Georgia O’Keefe in art. Local
geniuses are also extraordinarily gifted. But whereas geniuses
are recognized as such exclusively on the basis of the products
they create, regardless of the ethical quality of the lives that
they lead, local geniuses are recognized as such primarily on
the basis of the overall ethical quality of the lives that they
lead. The excellence of geniuses does not depend at all on their

local communities. On the contrary, many geniuses are not
recognized as such by their contemporaries anywhere. Genius
is in some ways to person what utopia is to place. Geniuses
arise from somewhere, but their works must finally pass muster
everywhere. Local geniuses, by contrast, are defined by the
intersection of their lives with their locations.

“Great-souled human beings approach
self-sufficiency; local geniuses are most
definitely not self-sufficient, since their
excellence is continuously shaped in
vital ways by their communities.”
This latter fact distinguishes local geniuses from greatsouled men and women who share with local geniuses
excellence of character but who, like geniuses, do not finally
belong to a particular place. Indeed, Aristotle had some doubt
about whether those rare human beings who had achieved
the full complement of moral and intellectual virtue had any
need of other human beings. Great-souled human beings
approach self-sufficiency; local geniuses are most definitely
not self-sufficient, since their excellence is continuously
shaped in vital ways by their communities. All local geniuses
are fine and noble human beings, but not all fine and noble
human beings are local geniuses.
Nor are local geniuses, local heroes, or heroines. One
splendid moment of often self-sacrificial and always courageous achievement defines the local hero or heroine. Entire
companies of 9/11 firefighters were local heroes, but only
some of them were noble human beings. Local heroism has
nothing to do with the overall tenor of a life. Like geniuses,
local heroes and heroines are known for what they do or
produce, not for who they are. Local geniuses are at least in
one respect like local heroes or heroines in that they must
along the way do some things that are truly exceptional.

Example of a Local Genius
Local geniuses, in other words, are not “representative”
people. John Strietelmeier was anything but a “representative” or typical citizen of Valparaiso, Indiana. In the words
of one of his eulogists, one could have seen in John “what a
nineteenth century English gentleman might look like if he
happened to tumble into the more disheveled and thread-bare
twentieth century. John’s gentlemanly traits were a becoming
modesty, an instinctive traditionalism, a certain reticence
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of feeling, a capacious mind, a fundamental sense of fair
play, a robust churchmanship, a firm loyalty to friends and
colleagues…charity and respect for the lesser fortunate, and a
generous love for all things human.”

“John’s real life genius was a matter of
the manner in which these several
accomplishments and many others
besides were undertaken, woven
together, and offered up in service
to his community.”
John Strietelmeier fit himself to the contours of the many
communities in Valparaiso; his standing as a local genius in
the whole, comprehensive community was his own doing.
This work of local genius included John’s patient, uncomplaining care over many years for his invalid and increasingly
demented wife. It included as well his joint authorship,
credentialed with only a master’s degree, of an influential
geography text, his twenty-year editorship of a journal
of literature, the arts, and public affairs, his service as an
academic vice president, and his authorship of the centennial
history of Valparaiso University.
But these achievements are mere items in an obituary
listing. John’s real life genius was a matter of the manner in
which these several accomplishments and many others besides
were undertaken, woven together, and offered up in service to
his community. This involved thousands of decisions about
when to yield to the call of duty, when to sacrifice personal
ambition and when to pursue it, when to speak and when to keep
silent, when to prefer parody and comedy to plain speaking.
This pliable resourcefulness, this almost unfailing ability to
know when to scold and when to bless, when to conform and
when to dissent, this capacity to shape a life in seamless devotion to the tasks immediately to hand—this was a life’s work.
The measure of that life cannot be a brittle yardstick of
absolute standards but instead a flexible tape measure that
follows carefully all of the contours of that peculiar piece
of the Valparaiso puzzle that John Strietelmeier was for so
many years. John was a great character whose genius was
constituted by his context, a man who excelled where he
found himself stationed in life. His excellence was the direct
result of his own construal of his life as the response to a
summons from Almighty God.
I am guessing that everyone knows people like John
Strietelmeier. I am guessing that many of them are graduates
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to your colleges and universities. And if the LECNA study
is to be credited, I am guessing further that the people you
know who remind you of John have attained a level of excellence that you admire in part because they are graduates of
the schools you represent. What then is the “value added” to
an education at a Lutheran college? It is the formation of a
certain kind of character that can be understood, assessed,
and celebrated only under the aspect of vocation.

Adding Value Added
I must begin this concluding section by complicating what I
have already said. For we do not, after all, respond to our callings alone; we do so in community with others. Thus, we can
speak intelligibly about the vocation of a Lutheran college,
understanding that all members of such academic communities have different roles to play. John Strietelmeier did not live
out his vocation in isolation from others. On the contrary, his
flexible responsiveness to the needs of others and his dependence upon the work and the gifts of others were parts of
what defined his character.
But do we really want to claim then that John exemplified
the only kind of excellence that all Lutheran college students
should emulate and that the colleges should seek to reward
and celebrate? Yes and no. Yes, because a life like John’s does
capture that special quality of Lutheran college graduates
that we easily recognize but often fail to try to articulate. No,
because it would be absurd not to recognize and celebrate our
Pulitzer Prize winners, outstanding athletes, and inventive
entrepreneurs on the grounds that such people often fall short
of the mark as spouses or children or citizens or volunteers.
Real genius often shows itself as part of a team effort. Within
a marriage, for example, we might well witness over time
one partner devoting herself to the achievement of excellence in a particularly demanding field like medicine while
the other partner nobly carries forward familial and civic
responsibilities. What we should say here is that the Lutheran
college enlarges our conceptions of human excellence just as it
enlarges the scope of academic freedom by inviting us to attend
to ultimate questions and to matters of faith as well as reason.
With this qualification in mind, let me invite us to
consider how we might revise or strengthen our present
practices with our academies to make more obvious and more
compelling the added value we evoke and provide as colleges
and universities of the church. One collection of practices
that we should review in light of what I have suggested
about human excellence are our memorial services, eulogies, honorary degree conferrals, alumni recognitions, and

all of the other practices we have established in order to set
before the community embodiments of what we collectively
regard as praiseworthy. Do we, as part of these practices, seek
to articulate the special form of human excellence that we
should and that we do foster? Or are our choices for awards
and other forms of recognition pretty much the same as they
would be anywhere?

“The Lutheran college enlarges our
conceptions of human excellence just
as it enlarges the scope of academic
freedom by inviting us to attend to
ultimate questions and to matters of
faith as well as reason.”
In view of what I have just said about living out vocation
in community with others, we should also wonder how we
organize our work. For example, are academic departments
simply collections of independent contractors that depend
upon the department chair to provide all of the advising,
student recruiting, course scheduling, etc. that are essential
to education? Do we dare think of the task of providing a

good science education as a collective endeavor, encouraging
some faculty to provide advising, others to take responsibility
for continued pedagogical innovation for the whole department, others to shoulder the burden of collegiate governance,
and still others to focus upon research? Or do we prefer to ask
each faculty member to take his or her turn regardless of the
diversity of gifts and inclinations among them?
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Artist Statement for The Journey, by Peter Xiao
Almost always germinated somewhere between observation
and imagination, my work began, three decades ago, in
quasi-narrative and came to focus on picture-making itself.
The Journey came at middle age to dwell on my personal past
and present, and on future generation. Circling up above are
probable callings in my kids—sports, medicine, art, poetry
(plus a clown vaguely reminiscent of their grandfather Xiao
Qian, writer and journalist)—beneath which are schemes
of my youthful pictures. This painting launched my current
reflecting on my own life experiences starting with the years
of growing up in China.
I was a native of Beijing, China, and turned 10 during Mao’s
Cultural Revolution. When President Nixon helped reopen my
homeland to the world, I was fooling around with snakes and
wildlife on a labor farm where my parents, with hundreds

of other condemned writers and intellectuals belonging under
the Ministry of Culture, toiled in the rice paddies. After
two years on my own on the people’s commune after high
school, I entered Beijing Normal University to study English
and later came to Iowa to complete a B.A. in fine arts and
English. Following that, I received a Masters of Fine Arts from
Tyler School of Art, Temple University, was employed by the
Philadelphia Museum of Art, and then began teaching parttime and exhibiting my work in Philadelphia and New York.
In 1989, I joined the Art Department at Augustana College,
Rock Island, Illinois, where I am now professor of painting
and drawing and co-chair of the Asian Studies Program. My
contact information is Peterxiao@augustana.edu and by office
phone: (309) 794-7172.
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